Articles Posted in Proximate Causation

The Supreme Court of Texas has issued an opinion in USA Lending Group, Inc. v. Winstead, P.C., 669 S.W.3d 195 (2023). In this case the client sued its former law firm for failing to request damages in a default judgment motion. USA Lending hired the law firm to sue its former employee for breach of fiduciary duty. The law firm obtained a default judgment but did not seek an award of damages against the former employee of USA Lending. USA Lending sued the law firm for malpractice alleging that the Law Firm breached the duty of care by failing to include a damages claim in the default motion. The law firm moved to dismiss. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss but the Appellate Court reversed that decision on the ground that USA could not prove causation or collectability. The Supreme Court of Texas, in turn, reversed that decision and reinstated the complaint.

USA Lending provided an affidavit from its CEO that it instructed the law firm to seek damages and an affidavit from an expert witness, a former judge, who opinion that the request for damages would have been granted. A second expert opinion that the judgment could have been collected. The Supreme Court held that the affidavits of USA Lending created a question of fact that could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss and held that the case would be remanded for trial. The court stated:

The motion to dismiss stage is not a battle of evidence; it is the clearing of an initial hurdle.^[39] The Act does not select for plaintiffs certain to succeed; it screens out plaintiffs certain to fail—those who cannot support their claims with clear and specific evidence.^[40]  Because USA Lending adduced prima facie evidence to support its claim for legal malpractice, the court of appeals erred in ordering the case dismissed. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to the trial court.

Every plaintiff must surmount the hurdle of proximate causation. You cannot just allege that the lawyer committed malpractice, you must show how the error caused you damage. If you cannot do that, your legal malpractice case will be dismissed.  In Katsoris v. Bodnar & Milone, LLP, 2020 NY Slip Op 05040 (New York Appellate Division Second Department). The lawyers represented Katsoris in his divorce case, which was resolved by settlement. He sued for malpractice but the case was dismissed because Katsoris was unable to allege an error that caused any harm to him. The key discussion:

Here, the complaint failed to adequately allege actual, ascertainable damages. The general allegations that, as a result of the alleged acts of malpractice, the plaintiff was caused to incur “additional legal fees,” and caused to suffer “financial damages and expense,” “adverse financial consequences,” and “direct financial damage,” were all conclusory and inadequate to constitute “actual, ascertainable damages” (Dempster v Liotti, 86 AD3d at 177). To the extent that the complaint addressed the plaintiff’s settlement, the complaint alleged that the defendant’s negligence in its handling of the divorce action caused the plaintiff to suffer “direct prejudice . . . in both trial and/or settlement,” and that, but for such negligence, the plaintiff “would have fared far better at trial and/or in settlement of the Divorce Action.” These allegations are conclusory and lack any factual support, and they are inadequate to sufficiently allege that the stipulation of settlement that the plaintiff entered into with his former wife was “effectively compelled” by the mistakes of counsel (Rau v Borenkoff, 262 AD2d 388, 389; see Benishai v Epstein, 116 AD3d 726, 728). “The fact that the plaintiff subsequently was unhappy with the settlement [he] obtained . . . does not rise to the level of legal malpractice” (Holschauer v Fisher, 5 AD3d 553, 554). “Moreover, the plaintiff failed to plead specific factual allegations showing that, had he not settled, he would have obtained a more favorable outcome” (Schiller v Bender, Burrows & Rosenthal, LLP, 116 AD3d 756, 758; see Keness v Feldman, Kramer & Monaco, P.C., 105 AD3d at 813; Tortura v Sullivan Papain Block McGrath & Cannavo, P.C.,21 AD3d at 1083; Dweck Law Firm v Mann, 283 AD2d 292, 293; Rau v Borenkoff,262 AD2d at 389). Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court’s determination to grant that branch of the defendant’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the first cause of action, alleging legal malpractice.

Here, plaintiff could not explain what the lawyer did that was wrong and why that purported error caused damage.